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QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee because he or she opposed
discrimination forbidden by Title VII. The lower courts are
divided as to how such anti-retaliation provisions apply to
management officials, such as personnel or EEO officials,
whose duties include assuring compliance with Title VII
or implementing an employer’s anti-discrimination policy.
The question presented is:
Are management officials:
(1) subject to exclusion from protection under
section 704(a) if their actions are within the scope
of their official duties (the rule in the Fifth, Eighth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits),
(2) protected under section 704(a) regardless of
whether their actions are within the scope of their
official duties (the rule in the Sixth and District of
Columbia Circuits), or
(3) subject to exclusion from protection under
section 704(a) if their actions are not within the
scope of their official duties (the rule in the Ninth
Circuit)?
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Petitioner Janet Brush respectfully prays that this
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals entered
on March 26, 2012.
OPINIONS BELOW
The March 26, 2012 opinion of the Court of Appeals,
which is reported at 466 Fed.Appx. 781 (11th Cir. 2012),
is set out at pp. la-16a of the Appendix. The May 31,
2012 order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing
and rehearing en banc, which is not reported, is set out
at pp. 42a-43a of the Appendix. The January 14, 2011
Order of the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, which is not reported, is set out at pp. 17a-41a of
the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered
on March 26, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc was denied on May 31,2012. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice, made an unlawful employment
practice by this title, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
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any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The courts of appeals are divided regarding whether
the anti-retaliation provisions of federal employment
laws protect personnel and other management officials
whose job responsibilities include assuring compliance
with those statutes. In the instant case a Sears employee
complained to her employer that she had been sexually
harassed; there is no dispute that section 704(a) of
Title VII protected the harassment victim herself from
retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that
section 704(a) did not protect petitioner—the key Sears
official who notified others of the complaint, unearthed
the nature of the harassment, and pressed the company
to take speedier and more aggressive action in response.
The Court of Appeals applied to petitioner’s section 704(a)
retaliation claim a court-made “manager rule” exception
to federal anti-retaliation laws. The Sixth and District of
Columbia Circuits have expressly rejected that limitation
on the protections of section 704(a).
(1) The Events Giving Rise to This Action
At the time of the events giving rise to this action,
Brush worked for Sears as a Loss Prevention District
Coach. Her job was to reduce a variety of risks to
the company, particularly losses due to theft. In midSeptember 2007, Brush received a call late one evening
on her cell phone from Mrs. Doe1, whom she had known
1.
Because of the seriousness of the conduct alleged, we refer
to the victim and harasser respectively as “Mrs. Doe” and the
“ Store Coach,” rather than using their actual names.
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for many years.2Mrs. Doe reported to Brush that she was
being sexually harassed by her Store Coach (Sears’ title
for a store manager), but provided few details. Brush gave
this information to higher ranking Sears officials, who
decided to suspend the Store Coach, and directed that
Scott Reuter (a District Manager) interview Mrs. Doe
and other possible witnesses. (App. 5a, 20a-21a). Brush
accompanied Reuter, although her responsibility was
largely limited to taking notes and serving as a witness
to whatever was said in response to Reuter’s questions.3
Mrs. Doe, when interviewed by Reuter (accompanied
by Brush), provided some information about the sexual
harassment, but Brush concluded that Mrs. Doe was not
revealing the full extent of the harassment because she
was uncomfortable speaking with Reuter, a man whom
Doe did not know. After Reuter’s questioning had ended
and Mrs. Doe had left the room, Brush told Reuter that she
intended to speak with Doe alone, and Reuter acquiesced.4
(App. 5a). When questioned by Brush outside Reuter’s
presence, Mrs. Doe disclosed the gravity of what had
occurred.
I said, “[Mrs. Doe], did you tell Scott the whole
story?’ That’s all I said. [Mrs. Doe] looked
down to the ground and just started crying
hysterically. And said, “No, Janet, I didn’t tell
Scott the whole story. [The Store Coach] raped
me three times in the loft.”5
2. Complaint H43.
3. Brush Dep., 9.
4. Brush Dep., 72, 98; Complaint, 111 35, 42.
5. Brush Dep., 73.
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Mrs. Doe indicated she did not want her husband to find
out about the attacks (App. 5a); there was conflicting
evidence regarding what if anything Mrs. Doe said about
not telling others.6
Brush reported Doe’s statement to Reuter, and
together they called their supervisor, Bob Church. Brush
pressed Church to take action, suggesting that Sears
contact the police, contending that she was not competent
to investigate charges of such criminal acts. Church,
however, declined to do so, explaining he wanted to talk
to “Legal.” In a conversation the next day, Brush again
pressed Church in vain to take some further action.7Brush
concluded that Church had “brushed [the rape report]
under the rug.”8 Brush later explained that she wanted
Sears to do more because “we were not taking care of
our associates.”9
6. Brush testified that Mrs. Doe asked only that Brush not
tell Doe’s husband. According to Brush, Doe did not object when
Brush indicated she would have to notify her superiors. (Brush
Dep. 73). On Brush’s account the issue of contacting the police or
any others never arose during her interview with Doe. (Brush
Dep., 73-75). Doe described the exchange differently, stating that
she “asked [Brush] not to say nothing because I didn’t want the
police involved.” (Doe Dep., 15). The District Court noted that “[e]
xactly what occurred during this interview is in dispute.” (App. 12a
n. 3). The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded that
there was an express discussion about the police (not merely a
general request that no one be told about the rapes), and that Doe
had specifically asked that the police not be notified. (App. 5a).
7. Brush Dep., 76-77.
8. Brush Dep., 6, 85.
9. Brush Dept., 85.
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In early October, after interviewing both Mrs. Doe
and the Store Coach, Church met with Brush. When
Church suggested that the Store Coach had merely
engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with Mrs.
Doe, Brush vehemently disagreed, insisting that Doe was
“visibly frightened of this man.” Brush rejected on the
same ground Church’s suggestion that Mrs. Doe had been
trying to cover up a consensual relationship with the Store
Coach because of his race. Shortly after this meeting, the
Store Coach was fired. (App. 5a). There were no further
discussions about the matter between Brush and other
Sears officials, until after Brush was dismissed.10
On November 20, 2007, Sears fired Brush. (Id.). She
was told at the time that the reason for the dismissal was
that she had violated Sears policy when she unearthed
the rapes, because at the time Brush re-interviewed
Mrs. Doe she was not accompanied by Mr. Reuter.
(App.6a and n. 4).11 Brush filed a Title VII charge with
the EEOC, alleging that she had been dismissed because
of the actions she had taken in unearthing and seeking
to correct the harassment of Mrs. Doe. The EEOC made
a cause finding (App. 6a), concluding that Brush had
indeed been “terminated in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity.” The Commission found that Sears
“was unhappy with the way [Brush] asked the questions
and embarrassed at the way she handled the matter.. . .
10. Brush Dep., 92-94.
11. Sears’ printed “ Guide on How To Investigate” states
“ [h]aving a witness (another coach) present during the interview
is helpful (but not necessary) to prevent conflicting statements
and avoid issues with uncooperative parties.” (Doc. 32-24, p. 30;
Doc. 38-11, p. 3 (Emphasis added)).
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[Sears] negatively viewed her participation in the sexual
harassment investigation and terminated her employment
under pretextual reasons.”12
(2) The Proceedings Below
Brush filed suit in district court, asserting that she
had been fired “because she uncovered that Defendant
had negligently allowed three forcible rapes to occur on its
premises,” and “because she raised rape issues that would
have been kept hidden if she had allowed Mr. Reuter to
conduct the interviews.” (Complaint, ITU59, 60; App. 6a).
That retaliation, the complaint asserted, violated section
704(a) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Sears moved for summary judgment, arguing inter
alia that section 704(a) did not forbid retaliation against
Brush because of the so-called “manager rule.”13 The
District Court agreed. Brush’s retaliation claim was
barred, the District Court held, by the manager rule
applied in several circuits, because Brush was acting
within the scope of her employment when she opposed
the sexual harassment of Mrs. Doe. (App. 28a-31a).14
12. Doc. 38-4, p. 2.
13. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion
for Summary Final Judgment, p. 9(“plaintiff cannot establish
protected activity because the alleged activity occurred in the
course of performing her job duties.”)(capitalization omitted); see
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Final Judgment, pp. 4-5.
14. The District Court also granted summary judgment on
other grounds. The Court of Appeals did not reach those other
issues, which thus are not relevant at this stage in the proceedings.
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“[T]he rule . . . forecloses oppositional activity claims
by managers who are simply performing their duties.”
(App. 31a; see 30a(“the long line of cases that preclude a
finding of protected activity when the activity occurs in
the course of performing one’s job duties”) ). Plaintiff’s
actions were unprotected since they “occurred during the
course of the performance of her job.” (App. 28a). In light
of the manager rule, the District Judge insisted, Brush’s
assertion that “she ‘disapproved’ of the store manager’s
alleged rape is meaningless.” (App. 30a).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground,
adopting and applying a version of the “manager rule”
utilized in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. Under that rule,
the Court of Appeals explained, an official who opposes
discrimination against someone else is not protected from
retaliation by section 704(a) if that opposition was within
“the scope of [the official’s] employment.” (App. 14 n. 8).
“[W]e find the ‘manager rule’ persuasive and a viable
prohibition against certain individuals recovering under
Title VII.” (App. 13a). “[T]he ‘manager rule’ holds that a
management employee that, in the course of her normal
job performance, disagrees with or opposes the actions of
an employer does not engage in ‘protected activity.’” (App.
12a). Regardless of whether Brush personally opposed
sexual harassment or wanted to correct or prevent such
abuse, the Eleventh Circuit held, under the manager rule
the actions that Brush took were not “protected activity”
under section 704(a) because her “job responsibilities
involved exactly the type of actions that Brush took on
Mrs. Doe’s behalf.” (App.l3a).
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The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
[t]hrough discovery, Brush produced evidence
that showed she “opposed the alleged sexual
battery [experienced by Mrs. Doe], explained
[to her employer, Sears] that the seriousness of
those allegations required police intervention,
and that she wanted to call the Orange County
Police.”
(App. 6a)(additions in opinion)(quoting appellate brief).
Brush also provided some circumstantial
evidence that her termination may have been
related to her involvement in the internal
investigation conducted by Sears. In particular,
she cited a declaration by her former boss,
. . . who stated that he “believe[d] Ms. Brush
was terminated because of her involvement in
uncovering and opposing rapes that took place
on [Sears’] property.”
(App. 7a). But because of the manager rule, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that this evidence was legally irrelevant.
Brush filed a timely petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc. The petition was denied on May 31,
2012. (App. 42a-43a).
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.

THE CIRCUITS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER
THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF A “ MANAGER
RULE” EXCEPTION TO SECTION 704(a) AND
OTHER FEDERAL ANTI-RETALIATION LAWS

This case presents a complex circuit conflict regarding
whether the anti-retaliation provisions in federal
employment statutes apply to management officials
whose responsibilities include reporting, investigating,
or preventing violations of those laws. The question has
arisen most often, as here, with regard to section 704(a) of
Title VII, which prohibits retaliation against any employee
who opposes discrimination forbidden by Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “[C]ourts have long acknowledged
the difficult situation of reconciling the language of Title
VII with the dismissal of an employee whose job it is to
handle discrimination complaints.” Schanfield v. Sojitz
Corp. of America, 663 F.Supp. 2d 305,342 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(footnote omitted).
The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted a “manager rule,” under which an official may
be denied the protections of a statutory anti-retaliation
provision if his or her actions are within the scope of
the official’s duties. The Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits have rejected the manager rule, holding that
anti-retaliation provisions such as section 704(a) accord the
same protection to managers, supervisors and personnel
officials that they provide to other workers. The courts of
appeals that do utilize the manager rule disagree among
themselves about whether the rule applies to an official
who— although acting within the scope of his or her

10

responsibilities—is attempting to assist a particular
employee or group of employees. The Ninth Circuit
applies a standard that is essentially the opposite of the
manager rule, holding that a manager can be denied the
protection of an anti-retaliation provision because his or
her conduct was outside the scope of his or her employment
and adverse to the interest of the employer.
In the lower courts, the manager rule is not tied to
the text of the statute involved, but is treated as a federal
common law of retaliation. In addition to Title VII, the
rule has been applied to a wide variety of other federal
statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act15, the
Americans with Disabilities Act16, the Uniformed Services
15. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d 617 (5th Cir.
2008); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F. 3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996).
16. In Clemons v. Nike, Inc., 2007 W L 2890972 (D.Or. Sept.
28), the plaintiff, an employee relations specialist, was assigned
the task of finding a reasonable accommodation under the ADA
for an employee who was losing his sight. When initial efforts
to find another position were unsuccessful, the plaintiff was
directed to dismiss the disabled worker. The plaintiff responded
that the disabled worker and the company “needed more time
to engage in the [legally required] interactive process [under
the ADA],” 2007 W L 2890972 at *3, and that “ to terminate
the employee, in the middle of the interactive process to find
a reasonable accommodation, violated the ADA.” Id. at *9.
The employer agreed to allow another week and a half to find
another job for the disabled worker, but then fired the plaintiff.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation
claim on the ground that, in seeking to assure compliance with
the ADA, “ Clemons was performing her job.” Id. at *10. In
the court below Sears relied on the decision in Clemons as an
example of the manager rule. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
In Support of Its Motion For Summary Final Judgment, p. 9.
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Employment and Reemployment Rights Act17, the Family
and Medical Leave Act18, the Sarbanes Oxley Act19, and
Title IX.20 These decisions most often rely on opinions
construing other federal statutes, and are not based on
the purpose or text of the particular provision at issue.
Federal courts have also applied the manager rule to
claims under state anti-retaliation statutes, relying on
the federal court-fashioned manager-rule doctrine rather
than on the text or purpose of, or state court decisions
regarding, the state statute at issue.21 Thus, while the
instant appeal concerns whether a “manager rule” limits
the protections of section 704(a) of Title VII, this case has
important implications for a broad range of federal anti
retaliation statutes.
A. The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
Have Adopted A Court-Created “Manager Rule”
Exception to Section 704(a) and Other Federal
Anti-Retaliation Statutes
The essence of the manager rule is to deny to certain
officials protections that would be accorded to the direct
17. Cook v. CTC Communications Corp., 2007 WL 3284337
at *9-*10 (D.N.H. Oct. 30).
18. Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC, 2011 WL
3803789 at *12 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 29).
19. Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, 2011 WL 4348298
(M.D.Tenn. Sept. 16).
20. Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 635 F.Supp. 2d 581
(E.D.Pa. 2009).
21. See Hill v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2997556
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 12).

12

victim of an unlawful employment practice. There is no
dispute that in the instant case section 704(a) would have
protected Mrs. Doe if she herself had taken the actions in
which Brush engaged—reporting sexual harassment to
Brush’s supervisor, insisting that Doe be interviewed by
Brush alone, pressing Sears to act with greater dispatch,
urging that the police be contacted, and maintaining
that Doe’s sexual contacts with the Store Coach were not
consensual. The question presented is whether section
704(a) protected Brush when she did so.
(1)
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s version of the
manager rule, actions that would be protected if engaged
in by a discrimination victim are not protected if taken
by an official who was “neither directly interested in the
underlying discrimination nor acting beyond the scope
of her employment in opposing an employer’s action.”
(App. 14a n. 8). Under the manager rule an official who
opposes harassment of or discrimination against other
employees can be retaliated against for having done so
if that opposition occurs “in the course of her normal
job performance.” (App. 12a). Thus, under the Eleventh
Circuit decision, the “actions that Brush took on Mrs.
Doe’s behalf” (App. 13a)—actions that would have been
protected if engaged in by Doe herself (or by a mere co
worker)—were not protected by section 704(a) because
Brush had acted “as a manager.” (Id.).
The Court of Appeals based the manager rule on
its view that the protection created by section 704(a)
was intended, at least primarily, for opposition activity
engaged in by the specific victim of the harassment or
other discriminatory practice. Crawford v. Metropolitan
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S.
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271 (2009), sets out the definitive account of what types
of actions and statements are protected by section 704(a).
But, the Eleventh Circuit insisted, Crawford only applies
to acts of and statements by discrimination victims
themselves. “Crawford . . . does not address whether
a disinterested party to a harassment claim could use
that claim [of discrimination against the victim] as its
own basis for a Title VII [retaliation] action.” (App. 13a).
“ [T]he breadth of Crawford's application to individuals
who suffered workplace discrimination is not transferrable
to the entirety of the management string that might
review any such allegation.” (Id.).
Brush would have us extend Crawford’s
reasoning not just to those directly impacted by
workplace discrimination but to all individuals
involved in the investigation, no matter how far
distant. Although we have not yet passed on the
transitive property of a Title VII claim, other
circuits have by creating what is known as the
“manager rule.”
(App. lla-12a).
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s manager rule, a manager
is not protected if, while acting within the scope of her
employment, she opposes discrimination against another
employee. Such a manager would be covered by section
704(a) only insofar as she was opposing discrimination in
the procedure for handling a discrimination complaint.
Thus, although Brush could not base a retaliation claim
on her opposition to sexual harassment of Mrs. Doe, she
would have been protected for opposing an unlawful
response to Doe’s complaint—e.g., if Sears had refused
to investigate the complaint because of Doe’s religion.
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Although she seeks to predicate her claim for
retaliation upon Mrs. Doe’s claims of sexual
harassment and rape, Brush was neither
the aggrieved nor the accused party in the
underlying allegations. Instead, she was one
of the Sears employees tasked with conducting
the internal investigation. As such her claims
relate not to Mrs. Doe’s allegations, but instead
to the procedures of the internal investigation
conducted by Sears.
(App. 10a) (emphasis added). The only viable manager
retaliation claim is one that “relates to” the manner in
which a discrimination claim is handled. In this case,
however, Sears’ handling of Doe’s harassment complaint
(as opposed to the treatment of Doe herself) was not itself
unlawful. “Brush . . . has cited no . . . federal law that
would have mandated Sears take some action other tha[n]
what it took.. . . [I]t is impossible for Brush to have had
a reasonable belief that Sears’ actions [in handling Doe’s
complaint] were unlawful.” (App. 14a).
(2)
Three other circuits have adopted a version of the
manager rule. The Eighth Circuit endorses the manager
rule as a limitation on Title VII retaliation claims. EEOC
v. HBE Corp., 135 F. 3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998). HBE
held that in a section 704(a) case there is “[a] requirement
of ‘stepping outside’ a normal role,” e.g. “outside the
normal managerial role which is to further company
policy.” That requirement is not met by “merely alert[ing]
management of potential violations of the law in order to
avoid liability for the company.” Id. In HBE the company’s
director of personnel, after being told to dismiss an
African-American employee, double checked (and found
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groundless) the criticism of that worker, expressed a
belief that the dismissal decision was racially motivated,
and ultimately refused to terminate that employee. The
Eighth Circuit held that the director of personnel was
protected only because he had refused to fire the worker,
since that refusal of a direct order “placed him outside
the normal managerial role which is to further company
policy.” 135 F. 3d at 554.
The Fifth Circuit adopted a manager rule in Hagan
v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d 617,627-30 (5th Cir.
2008). “[W]e agree that an employee must do something
outside his or her job role” to be protected by an anti
retaliation provision.” 529 F. 3d at 628.
If we did not require an employee to “step
outside the role” or otherwise make clear to
the employer that the employee was taking a
position adverse to the employer, nearly every
activity in the normal course of a manager’s
job would potentially be protected activity___
519 F. 3d at 628. “[OJtherwise . . . whole groups of
employees—management employees, human resources
employees, and legal employees, to name a few—[would]
be[] difficult to discharge . . . ” 529 F. 3d at 628.
The Tenth Circuit originated the manager rule in
McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F. 3d 1478,1486 (10th Cir.
1996). McKenzie concluded that an Assistant Personnel

Director did not engage in protected activity under the
FLSA when she expressed “concern” to higher officials
that the company might be in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Tenth Circuit held that bringing
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such information to the attention of the employer does
not constitute protected activity, so long as the official
does not go further and actually object to the practice in
question or disagree with the employer’s actions.
McKenzie was not asserting any rights under
the FLSA, but rather was merely performing
her everyday duties as personnel director . . . .
McKenzie never crossed the line from being
an employee merely performing her job as
personnel director . . . . [S]he [only] informed
the company that it was at risk of claims that
might be instituted by others . . . . In order to
engage in protected activity. . . , the employee
must step outside his or her role of representing
the company. . . .
94 F. 3d at 1486-87.
Although McKenzie and Hagan involved retaliation
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the manager
rule is treated as a matter of general federal law, rather
than a construction of any particular federal statute.
Thus, McKenzie and Hagan are the authorities on which
the lower courts have generally relied in applying the
manager rule in Title VII cases. In the instant case both
the Eleventh Circuit and the District Court (as well as the
defendant itself22) relied on McKenzie and Hagan as the
basis for the manager rule. (App. 12a, 28a).

22.
Defendant’s Memorandum of law in Support of Its Motion
for Summary Final Judgment, p. 9.
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B. The Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits Have
Rejected The Manager Rule
Two circuits have squarely rejected the manager
rule, reasoning that this limitation on section 704(a) both
violates the rights of the officials involved and undermines
compliance with Title VII.
In Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F. 3d
561 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt
the manager rule limitation. The plaintiff in Johnson
was a Vice President for Human Resources and Human
Relations, and one of his primary responsibilities was to
manage the employer’s affirmative action program. He
was dismissed in retaliation for his advocacy on behalf
of minorities.
Plaintiff protested discrimination that occurred
in the hiring process . . . . [T]he fact that
Plaintiff may have had a contractual duty
to voice such concerns is of no consequence
to his claim. Under Title VII . . . there is no
qualification on who the individual doing the
complaining may be . . . . [T]he district court’s
conclusion, that as a high-level affirmative
action official Plaintiff could not claim protected
advocacy under the opposition clause .. . runs
counter to the broad approach used when
considering a claim for retaliation under this
clause . . . . [T]he district court allows for an
employer to retaliate against the person best
able to oppose the employer’s discriminatory
practices—the “high-level affirmative action
official”—without fear of reprisal under Title
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VII---- [T]he individual who has contracted to
advocate on behalf of women and minorities has
not thereby contracted to be retaliated against
for his advocacy.
215 F. 3d at 579-80 (emphasis omitted). One member of the
Sixth Circuit panel dissented, unsuccessfully urging the
adoption of the very scope-of-employment based manager
rule applied by the Eleventh Circuit in the instant case.
The plaintiff contends that he was terminated
for his active advocacy on behalf of minorities,
yet, this was his job. If he was not performing
his job to the satisfaction of his employers,
the University is entitled to dismiss him.
The plaintiff has presented no evidence that
his advocacy went beyond the scope of his
employment, and I believe this is significant.
I do think that the plaintiffs employment as a
high level affirmative action officer does and
should make a difference in the analysis of his
claims. Because it was his job to advocate on
behalf of minorities I do not think he is entitled
to protected status for his general advocacy on
behalf of minorities.
215 F. 3d at 587-88 (Kennedy, J. concurring and dissenting)
(emphasis added); see Nemeth v. Citizens Financial
Group, Inc., 2011 W L 2531200 at *6 (E.D.Mich. June 24)
(rejecting manager rule defense in light of Johnson).
In Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F. 2d 1113
(D.C.Cir. 1981), the plaintiff was a federal EEO Counselor;
the district court found that Smith had been retaliated
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against because of his EEO activities. On appeal, one
member of the appellate court argued that the court
should adopt a version of the manager rule, and should
hold that section 704(a) does not protect EEO officials from
retaliation for conduct that is part of their job assignment.
This provision of the Act was not designed to
protect those, such as EEO counselors, whose
own employer . . . has assigned them to work
on civil rights matters . . . . Mere participation
in EEO is insufficient.
659 F. 2d at 1124 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The District
of Columbia Circuit, however, emphatically rejected that
proposed limitation on the scope of section 704(a).
[T]he plain language of Title VII prohibits
reprisals against employees for their
participation in EEO activities . . . . Smith’s
EEO work, performed pursuant to a designation
by the Department of the Navy, plainly falls
within the protective ambit of the statutory
language. It is the explicit function of EEO
officers to “assist” in “investigation(s)” and
“proceeding(s)” under Title VII, and it is for
work of this kind that Smith was penalized.
. . . . Smith was found to be the victim of an
“improper consideration of his EEO duties”;
he was . . . wrongly criticized for performing
functions given protected status under Title
VII.
659 F. 2d at 1121-22. The District of Columbia Circuit
opinion specifically noted that Title VII protects officials
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who conduct internal investigations—one of the key actions
in which Brush had engaged—even when conducting such
investigations is an “explicit function” of the position in
question.
C. The Circuits That Have Adopted The Manager Rule
Disagree About When That Rule Applies
The circuits that have adopted the manager rule are
divided about when it applies. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits
hold that the rule does not bar protection of a manager—
even if acting within the scope of his or her employment—
if he or she assists or advocates for an employee whose
rights may have been violated, or complains to other
officials about the manner in which the employer has
dealt with the asserted violation of that employee’s rights.
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand,
recognize no such limitation on the manager rule.
In the seminal decision in McKenzie v. Renberg’s,
Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that the manager rule does
not apply—and a management official is protected from
retaliation—if he or she goes beyond merely informing
the employer of a risk of liability and “actively assist[s]
other employees in asserting. . . rights.” 94 F. 3d at 1486.
A manager’s actions would thus constitute protected
activity, the Tenth Circuit holds, if the manager assisted
the employee in some way, such as by engaging in
“advocacy of rights [of the employee],” being “supportive
of adverse rights [of that worker],” or “complaining] to
superiors.” M (emphasis added). The manager rule did
apply in McKenzie because the plaintiff there had merely
expressed “concerns” about whether company practices
were legal and “informed the company that it was at risk
of claims that might be instituted by others.” Id.
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The Fifth Circuit recognized the same limitation on the
manager rule in Hagan v. Echo Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F. 3d
617 (5th Cir. 2008). The supervisor in that case had merely
passed on to other officials a question that subordinates
had raised regarding possible entitlement to additional
overtime pay. The Fifth Circuit held that this action was
subject to the manager rule because the supervisor had
no intent to assist the workers in obtaining more money
and did not in fact believe that they were entitled to the
additional compensation they sought. 529 F. 3d at 630.
The plaintiff was simply repeating to his superiors the
question asked by his subordinates, not “assisting [those]
employees in asserting rights.” 529 F. 3d at 628 (<quoting
McKenzie, 94 F. 3d at 1486-87). The plaintiff would have
been protected from retaliation if he had “complain[ed] to
his employer on behalf of [the workers],” was acting “as
an advocate for [the subordinates],” or was “personally
advocating on behalf of his [subordinate’s] statutory
rights.” 529 F. 3d at 629-30.
But neither the Eighth Circuit in HBE nor the Eleventh
Circuit in the instant case recognizes such a limitation on
the manager rule. The difference between the Fifth and
Tenth Circuit version of the manager rule, on the one hand,
and the version in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, is of
controlling importance in the instant case. The Eleventh
Circuit correctly recognized that Brush had “acted on
Doe’s behalf.” (App. 13a). Brush repeatedly complained
about the manner in which Sears’ was responding to Doe’s
complaint, pressing for quicker action and for the selection
of an investigator with criminal investigation expertise.
When higher officials suggested that Doe might be lying
to cover up a consensual sexual relationship with the
Store Coach, Brush spoke up on Doe’s behalf, insisting
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the sexual relationship could not have been consensual
because Doe—when being interviewed by Brush—was
“visibly frightened of this man.”23 In the Fifth and Tenth
Circuit those actions by Brush would have placed her
outside the manager rule, and would have constituted
protected activity. But in the Eleventh Circuit all that
mattered was that Brush’s actions—regardless of whether
they involved assistance, advocacy and complaining to
superiors—were within Brush’s scope of employment.
D. The Ninth Circuit Applies A Rule That Is The
Opposite of The Plurality Manager Rule
The four circuits applying the manager rule do agree
that the rule would not apply to an official who stepped
outside of his or her official role and took some action that
was adverse to the interests of the employer. (See App.
13a). Several of those decisions cite as the quintessential
example of that type of protected activity the filing
with government officials of a charge that the employer
had engaged in an unlawful employment action. E.g.,
McKenzie, 94 F. 3d at 1486 (manager protected if she
“initiate[s] a . . . claim against the company on her own
behalf or on behalf of anyone else”).
In Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F. 2d 214 (9th Cir. 1981),
however, the Ninth Circuit applied the opposite rule,
holding that filing such charges was not protected
precisely because it was outside the official’s scope of
employment and adverse to the interests of the employer.
In Smith the plaintiff, a director of industrial relations,
filed complaints with EEOC and another federal agency
23. Brush Dep., 92-93.
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alleging widespread discriminatory practices at a
particular facility. The Ninth Circuit held that Smith
could be dismissed for that action precisely because it was
adverse to the interests of the company.
[I]f . . . . he was fired simply for having filed
[the complaints], we conclude that firing him
. . . would have been justified. . . . [Plaintiffs]
position . . . required the occupant to act
on behalf of his employer in an area where
normally action against the employer and on
behalf of the employees is protected activity.
. . . If § 2000e-3(a) give [plaintiff] the right to
make himself an adversary of the company,
then . . . he is forever immune from discharge.
. . . By filing complaints against Singer . .. . ,
appellant placed himself in a position squarely
adversary to his company. In doing so he wholly
disabled himself from continuing to represent
the company’s interest... and from continuing
to work with Singer executives . . . .
650 F.3d at 216-17 (emphasis added); see id. at 216 (section
704(a) does not protect opposition that is “inconsistent with
the requirements of the employee’s position.”).
II. THE MANAGER RULE CREATES A MAJOR
OBSTACLE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE
VII AND OTHER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
STATUTES
The manager rule strikes at the very heart of the
voluntary compliance mechanisms on which Title VII
depends and which section 704(a) was enacted to protect.
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In the four circuits which have adopted the manager
rule as a major restriction on the scope of section 704(a),
employers today are often permitted to retaliate against
anti-discrimination efforts by the very personnel and
other management officials who are in the best position to
prevent and correct violations of Title VII. District court
decisions applying the manager rule have repeatedly
sanctioned reprisals against officials who were attempting
to assure compliance with Title VII and other important
federal employment laws. The serious obstacle to
implementation of federal law that has been created by the
manager rule poses an important problem that warrants
review by this Court.
In enacting Title VII and other federal employment
statutes, Congress did not provide that those laws would be
enforced by an army of federal agents constantly visiting
and monitoring every private and public employer in the
nation. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288, 292 (1960). Rather, compliance with these statutes
rests largely on the voluntary actions of employers, which
necessarily requires effective internal mechanisms for
“prevent[ing] and promptly correct[ing]” violations of the
statute. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742,765 (1998). The efficacy of those internal mechanisms
turns to a substantial degree on the skill and commitment
of the officials who administer them.
The internal compliance mechanisms on which Title
VII depends could not possibly function effectively if
the management officials responsible for detecting and
correcting violations of the statute could lawfully be
retaliated against when—indeed because—they were
carrying out those very duties. The types of retaliatory
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acts that “well might. . . ‘dissuade[] a reasonable worker
from making... a charge of discrimination,’” Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006), would be equally effective in deterring a reasonable
official from reporting allegations of discrimination, from
conducting a thorough investigation of such charges, and
from reaching conclusions that might be disfavored by
higher officials. Risk of retaliation that chills the operation
of an employer’s internal machinery can be an even
greater threat to voluntary compliance than the danger
of reprisal that deters a single individual victim.
[EJxtending the [manager] rule [to section
704(a)] would strip Title VII protection from
“whole groups of employees—management
employees, human resources employees, and
legal employees, to name a few”—employees
who are in the best position to advise employers
about compliance.
Rangel v. Omni Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 2010 WL 3927744
at *5 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 4){quoting Hagan, 529 F. 3d at 528).

The manager rule has been applied to retaliation claims
of precisely those individuals who it is most important
be able to oppose discrimination “without apprehension
of personal consequences to [themselves,]” Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978): a Director of
Personnel24, a Human Resources Director25, a human
24. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F. 3d at 549; McKenzie, 94 F.
3d at 1481.
25. Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F.Supp. 2d
60,61 (D.P.R. 2005); Adams v. Northstar Location Services, Inc.,
2010 WL 3911415 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 1).
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resources manager26, an “ HR professional”27, a Senior
Employee Relations Specialist28, and a Director of an
Office of Diversity.29
The efforts of such officials to oppose violations of
federal employment laws—like the complaints of the
victims themselves— can trigger retaliation. In some
instances that may occur because the individual being
investigated outranks the personnel official conducting
the investigation. In Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing,
Inc., 380 F.Supp. 2d 60 (D.RR. 2005), relied on by the
District Court below (App. 28a), a company’s Human
Resources Director informed the company president
and vice-president that “in accordance with his duties,
he was initiating an investigation concerning complaints
of sexual harassment against them.” 380 F.Supp. 2d at
61. The plaintiff “was terminated that afternoon.” Id.
Applying the manager rule, the district court dismissed
the plaintiff’s section 704(a) claim, holding that the
plaintiff’s actions were not “protected activities” under
Title VII because those actions “were part of his job
responsibilities.” 380 F. Supp. 2d at 62. “Vidal was working
in his capacity as a Human Resources Director, for the
benefit of the company, and in accordance with its policies
forbidding sexual harassment, when he notified [his
26. Cook v. CTC Communications Corp., 2007 WL 3284337
at *1 (D.N.H. Oct. 30).
27. Bradford v. UPMC, 2008 W L 191706 at *3 (W.D.Pa. Jan.
18).
28. Clemons v. Nike, Inc., 2007 WL 2890972 (D.Or. 2007).
29. Johnson v. County of Nassau, 480 F.Supp. 2d 481, 588
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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superiors] of the claims against them and of his intention
to start an investigation on the matter.” Id. Personnel
officials may run a similar risk if the individual alleged
to have engaged in discrimination is a valuable employee
whom management would prefer not to fire or embarrass;
in sexual harassment cases the harasser ordinarily holds
a higher, more important position than the victim, and is
using that elevated position to intimidate his victim. See
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-03
(1998).
Upper management may also object to internal efforts
to comply with federal employment law because they
could cost the firm money. In Stein v. Rousseau, 2006
WL 2263340 (E.D.Wa. Aug. 8), a manager pointed out
that the employer’s existing overtime-compensation policy
was unlawful under the FLSA; the firm’s owner agreed
to change the policy. A disagreement arose about what
to say to workers about the firm’s earlier policy, which
ended with one of the owners shouting at the manager, “I
am not kidding, if they come in here and it costs me tens
of thousands of dollars, we will take you out behind the
building and shoot you.” Id. at *1. The manager was fired
the next day. The district court held that the retaliation
suit of the dismissed official was barred by the manager
rule. Id. at *4. Any internal investigation that unearths
evidence of a Title VII violation also has the potential to
result in unwanted financial exposure for the employer
and thus anger higher officials.
The manager rule is not limited in its application to
personnel officials; it has been applied to any supervisor
who— as is true of most supervisors—has a duty to
report problems to higher officials. For example, in
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Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, 2008 WL

1848796 (M.D. Ala. April 24), the retaliation victim was an
automobile plant official responsible for purchasing parts.
Id. at *2. The district court held that he could be dismissed
for reporting several incidents of sexual harassment
because the official’s job responsibilities broadly included
“reporting] alleged unlawful conduct.” Id. at *11.
Plaintiff admits that his job constantly required
him to bring to the management. . . areas of
concern in the workplace. . . . Plaintiff . . . on
a weekly basis . . . participated in meetings
convened between [a Deputy President]
and the directors for the specific purpose of
addressing “concerns for the benefit of the
company” and flagging problems that needed
to be “rectified].”
Id. at *11. In Rice v. Spinx Co., 2012 WL 684019 (D.S.C.

March 2), the court applied the manager rule to dismiss
the Title VII claim of a store manager who was retaliated
against because, when an employee from another store
told him she had been sexually harassed, that manager
reported that harassment to higher officials, helped the
victim fill out the firm’s sexual harassment form, and
delivered that form to the company’s human resources
department. 2012 W L 684019 at *l-*5. Although Rice was
not a personnel official, his assistance for the harassment
victim was held unprotected because he was “following
Defendant’s harassment policy” and “acting within the
scope of his duties.” 2012 WL 684019 at *4 n. 4 and *5 n.
5. In Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 653 F.Supp. 2d 581
(E.D.Pa. 2009), the college’s Director of Athletics, in order
to bring about compliance with Title IX, had
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repeatedly and consistently advocated for both
female employees and female students in the
athletic program. She worked on increasing
scholarships to female athletes, ensuring
equitable funding of sports programs, hiring
full-time coaches for women’s sports, and
assuring equal pay for female coaching staff.
653 F.Supp. 2d at 596. The college ultimately terminated
the plaintiff, who filed suit claiming that she had been
fired in retaliation for her efforts to implement Title IX.
Applying the manager rule, the district court dismissed
her claim because her “Title IX activities fail to fall
within the realm of‘protected activity’ because she never
engaged in activity that was either adverse to the College
or outside the scope of her position as Athletic Director.”
Id.

The manager rule has also been applied to retaliation
claims by an office manager30, a field service manager31, a
sales and marketing director32, an Assistant Director of
Ambulance Services33, a Corporate Security Investigator34,

30. Mousavi v. Parkside Obstetrics, Gynecology & Infertility,
S.C., 2001 WL 3610080 at *1 (N.D.I11., Aug. 26).
31. Hagan, 529 F. 3d at 620.
32. Stewart v. Master Builders Association of King and
Snohomish Counties, 736 F.Supp. 1291,1293 (W.D.Wa. 2010).
33. George v. Board ofCnty. Comm’rs of Franklin County,
Kan., 2007 WL 950270 at *1 (D.Kan. March 26).
34. Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, 2011 WL 4348298
(M.D.Tenn. Sept. 16).
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a safety official35and the chairman of a college Department
of Economics and Finance.36
These cases illustrate the importance of removing
the manager rule as a deterrent to vigorous efforts by
individual officials to bring about compliance with Title
VII and other important federal employment laws.
III. THE MANAGER RULE IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 704(a)
The manager rule is inconsistent with the plain
language of section 704(a). The core principle of the
manager rule limitation is that the protections of section
704(a) do not apply to every employee who opposes sexual
harassment or other forms of discrimination. The Eleventh
Circuit emphatically insisted that section 704(a) does not
protect “all individuals involved” in internal efforts to
detect or correct discrimination (App. 11a). Rather, the
Court of Appeals reasoned, the protections created by
section 704(a) exist primarily for the discrimination victim
herself, and thus are “not transferable to the entirety
o f . . . management.” (App. 13a). The manager rule is a
“prohibition against certain individuals” invoking the
protections of section 704(a). (Id.).
Any such restriction on which employees are protected
by section 704(a) is incompatible with the terms of the
statute, which forbid an employer “to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . . because he has opposed any
35. Hill v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2997556 at *1.
36. Ezuma v. City University of New York, 665 F.Supp. 116,
118 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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practice, made an unlawful practice by this subchapter
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). The adjective
“any” precludes construing the statute, as have the
Eleventh Circuit and other lower courts, to forbid
retaliation only against some employees who oppose
unlawful discrimination, and to actually permit retaliation
against “certain” types of employees. The use of “any” is
inconsistent with reading into section 704(a) a limitation
that places a group of employees outside the protection
of the provision. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately
of whatever kind!” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997)(quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 97 (1976))(emphasis added). “[T]he normal
meaning of the term ‘any’ [allows of] no limitation.”
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974). ‘“[A]ny . . .’
suggest a broad interpretation.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325,1332 (2011).
When Congress wanted to exclude some category
of individuals from the protections of Title VII, it did so
expressly. For example, section 701(f) defines “employee”
to exclude elected officials and certain of their appointees.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Section 702(a) provides that Title
VII does not apply to the employment of an alien outside
the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a). Section 703(f)
provides that the prohibitions in Title VII (including
section 704(a)) do not include action taken by an employer
“with respect to an individual who is a member of the
communist Party” or certain related organizations.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(g) (individuals who cannot
fulfill applicable national security based requirement
not protected from certain adverse actions), 2000e-2(k)
(3) (disparate impact provision does not apply to certain
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users of controlled substances). This Court has repeatedly
refused to read into one provision of a statute a type of
exception that Congress expressly imposed only in other
provisions. Astrue v. Capato exrel. B.N.C., 132 S.Ct. 2021,
2029 (2012); Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
This Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), made clear that
the protections of section 704(a) are not limited to the
victims of unlawful discrimination. Section 704(a), the
Court explained, forbids retaliatory acts that “well might
have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from... supporting a
charge of discrimination,”’ 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting Rochon
v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211,1219 (D.C.Cir. 2006))(emphasis
added) or “are likely to dissuade employees from . . .
assisting in complaints about discrimination.” 548 U.S.
at 70 (emphasis added). Manifestly a personnel official or
other manager could “support[]” a discrimination charge
or “assist” the victim of sexual harassment. Burlington
N orthern’s, interpretation of section 704(a) clearly
encompasses the instant case, which the Eleventh Circuit
correctly described as involving “actions that Brush took
on Mrs. Doe’s behalf.” (App. 13a).
In Crawford this Court held that under section 704(a)
a sexual harassment victim could not be fired because,
in response to questions by “a Metro human resources
officer,” the victim “described several instances of sexually
harassing behavior.” 555 U.S. at 274. Under the manager
rule applied by the Eleventh Circuit, however, the very
human resources officer in Crawford, who was attempting
to prevent or correct violations of Title VII by “looking
into rumors of sexual harassment,” could have been fired
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for asking those questions, for reporting Ms. Crawford’s
answers to other officials, or for indicating that she
believed Crawford’s statements. Section 704(a) cannot
function as intended, protecting efforts to end violations
of Title VII, if only one party to such an investigatory
interview is protected from retaliation.
The decision below—and the manager rule—rest on
the mistaken assumption that conduct which is within the
scope of employment of a manager cannot also be opposition
to unlawful discrimination. But carrying out one’s official
duties and opposing violations of the law are not mutually
exclusive. For example, the employees of the EEOC and
of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
in their daily work are both opposing discrimination and
acting within the scope of their employment. So were
the attorneys from the Office of the Solicitor General
who represented the United States before this Court in
cases such as Crawford, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131
S.Ct. 1186 (2011), and Thompson v. North American
Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011). The fact that Brush
was acting within the scope of her employment when she
reported Doe’s allegations of sexual harassment, insisted
on re-interviewing Doe to find out the true nature of that
harassment, pressed her superiors for a speedier and
more aggressive response, and defended the veracity of
Doe’s claims is simply irrelevant to whether those actions
constituted opposition protected by section 704(a).
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of,certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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E rik W . S charf

Counsel of Record

R. A tkins
E rik W . S charf , P.A .
6574 North State Road 7, #381
Coconut Creek, FL 33073
(305) 665-0475
escharf@ewscharfpa.com

W ay n e

E ric S chnapper
U n iv e r sity of W ashington
S chool of L aw

P.O. Box 353020
Seattle, WA 98195
(206) 616-3167
D. B uckstein
420 South State Road 7
Suite 122
Wellington, FL 33414
(561) 795-9878

B rian

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
DATED MARCH 26, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10657
D.C. Docket No. 9:09-cv-81290-KLR
JANET BRUSH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
d.b.a. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal for the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Florida
(March 26, 2012)
B efore D U B IN A, C h ief Judge, FAY, and
KLEINFELD,* Circuit Judges.

* Honorable Andrew J. Kleinfeld, United States Circuit
Judge, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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FAY, Circuit Judge:
Long considered a formidable weapon against an
employer’s unlawful practices in the workplace, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
et seq., has historically been used by plaintiffs to recover
for discrimination on such bases as race, color, sex or
national origin.1 None of those recognized bases for
recovery are implicated here. At issue instead is an
employee’s termination following a company’s internal
investigation into an allegation of workplace sexual
harassment.2 The plaintiff here, though, was neither the
employee that complained of the sexual harassment nor
the employee allegedly responsible for that harassment.
Rather, Plaintiff-Appellant Janet Brush (“Brush”) was
one of the employees tasked with conducting the internal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)
(“ The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress
to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified jo b environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens.” ) (internal citations omitted); M er ito r
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66,106 S.Ct. 2399,91 L.Ed.2d
49 (1986) (recognizing discrimination based on sex is actionable
under Title VII).
2. The Complaint at issue here alleges causes of action under
both Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“ FCRA”),
Fla. Stat. § 760.10 et seq. However, we need not distinguish between
the two, since Plaintiff-Appellant concedes that both causes of
action are interpreted under similar standards. See also Harper
v. Blockbuster Entm ’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385,1389 (11th Cir.1998).
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investigation. Defendant-Appellee Sears Holding
Corporation (“Sears”) terminated her soon after.3Brush
subsequently filed suit against Sears, alleging she was
terminated in retaliation for certain actions she took as
an investigator of the sexual harassment claim.
Upon consideration of Sears’ motion for summary
judgment, the district court found Brush could not support
a Title VII retaliation claim. Among the deficiencies the
district court identified in Brush’s claim was the fact that
she was not engaged in “protected activity” as defined by
Title VII and therefore her subsequent termination could
not be actionable as retaliation. We affirm.
I.

“ This court reviews a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standards used by the district court.” Galvez v. Bruce,
552 F.3d 1238,1241 (11th Cir.2008). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Swisher Int’l.,
Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir.2008). “In
making this determination, we ... draw[ ] all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196
F.3d 1354,1358 (11th Cir.1999). Of course, the nonmoving
3.
Brush was employed by Kmart, which is a subsidiary of
Sears Holding Corporation. However, for the sake of clarity with
respect to the named defendant here, we refer to DefendantAppellee as “ Sears.”
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party must go beyond the pleadings to present affirmative
evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,252,106 S.Ct. 2505,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However,
a plaintiffs failure to support an essential element of her
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and
requires the district court to grant summary judgment
for the defendant. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, A ll U.S. 317,
322-23,106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
II.

Janet Brush worked for Sears or its affiliates, off and
on, for over fifteen years. In her most recent stint, Brush
was employed from approximately 2000 to November 20,
2007. Beginning in 2006, Brush accepted a position as a
Loss Prevention District Coach. The district she oversaw
contained 20 stores. Her job was to minimize varieties of
risk to the company, including losses arising from theft,
as well as to protect Sears’ assets, including its employees.
In that capacity, she interacted with numerous Sears
employees during the course of her employment. Her
immediate boss was David Pearson, who served as Sears’
Regional Loss Prevention Coach.
During Brush’s employment with Sears, Sears
had noted several deficiencies relating to Brush’s work
performance. These deficiencies first became apparent
at the end of 2006. Early the next year, Sears placed
Brush on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) to
address these deficiencies. Although Brush’s PIP plan
was extended several months to enable her to meet the
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relevant criteria, by all accounts Brush completed her PIP
on or around September 20, 2007.
Only a few days before her completion of the PIP
plan, on or around September 15, 2007, Brush received
a telephone call from an Assistant Store Coach. The
Assistant Store Coach, whom we refer to simply as
“Mrs. Doe,” informed Brush that she was being sexually
harassed by her Store Coach. Brush notified Sears
of the allegation. Sears suspended the Store Coach
accused of harassment and directed Brush and another
Sears employee, Scott Reuter, to meet with Mrs. Doe
to investigate further. They did so, but both Brush and
Reuter felt that she was not entirely forthcoming during
their interview. Reuter and Brush then determined that
Brush should meet with Mrs. Doe alone “to see if she
wanted to add anything to her prior interview.” Compl.
1140. Brush did so, at which time Mrs. Doe informed her
that she had been raped multiple times by the Store Coach.
However, Mrs. Doe asked that neither her husband nor the
police be informed of the rape. Brush notified Reuter of
what Mrs. Doe told her, and they subsequently reported
the same to Sears. Brush “stated that [Sears] need [ed]
to contact the Orange County Police.” Compl. H48. Sears
declined, citing the investigation’s incomplete status and
Mrs. Doe’s own desire not to involve law enforcement.
Sears, however, terminated the employment of the Store
Coach, the man who Mrs. Doe said harassed and raped
her. Brush nonetheless continued to urge the reporting
of the alleged rape.
On November 20, 2007, Sears terminated Brush’s
employment, citing her violation of Sears’ policy relating
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to the investigation of sexual harassment claims.4 One
week later, Brush filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging
sex discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued a
finding that there was reasonable cause to support Brush’s
retaliation claim.
Nearly two years later, Brush filed suit against Sears,
alleging that she was dismissed in retaliation for “her
opposition to the nature and performance of the [sexual
harassment] investigation.” Compl. H5. Specifically, her
Complaint alleges that she was terminated because “she
uncovered that [Sears] had negligently allowed three
forcible rapes to occur on its premises and did nothing
about it,” Compl. H59; because “she raised rape issues that
would have been kept hidden if she had allowed Mr. Reuter
to conduct the interviews,” Compl. 1160; “because of her
participation in the investigation and her opposition to
the way [Sears] was conducting the investigation,” Compl.
H61; and because “she was considered a trouble-maker
and whistleblower,” Compl. 1162.
Through discovery, Brush produced evidence
that showed she “opposed the alleged sexual battery
[experienced by Mrs. Doe], explained [to her employer,
Sears] that the seriousness of these allegations required
police intervention, and that she wanted to call the
Orange County Police.” Appellant Br. at 8. Furthermore,
4.
Specifically, Sears alleges Brush violated the sexual
harassment policy in meeting with the complainant alone, in sug
gesting to the employee that she had been raped without asking an
open-ended question to see what the employee said, and in failing
to properly investigate the claim by obtaining video evidence.
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deposition testimony demonstrated that Brush was “very
adamant... that the authorities should be involved because
Sears was not capable of investigating this type of criminal
activity.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Finally, Brush also provided some circumstantial evidence
that her termination may have been related to her
involvement in the internal investigation conducted by
Sears. In particular, she cited a declaration by her former
boss, Pearson, who stated that he “believe[d] Ms. Brush
was terminated because of her involvement in uncovering
and opposing rapes that took place on [Sears’] property.”
Id. at 11.
Nonetheless, subsequently Sears moved for summary
judgment, contending that Brush could not establish a
prima facie case of retaliation and that there was no
genuine issue of material fact showing that Sears’ decision
to terminate Brush was pretextual. The district court
agreed. Brush now appeals.
III.
Title V II’s anti-retaliation provision makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice ..., or because [s]he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d
1370,1375 (11th Cir.2008) (alterations in original) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). As noted by the Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
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& Davidson County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274,129 S.Ct.

846, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009), the two clauses of the anti
retaliation provision are known as the “participation
clause” and the “opposition clause.” Although Brush’s
allegations encompassed both means of retaliation, she
conceded before the district court that she may only
recover under the opposition clause in this instance. See
EEOC v. Total Sys. Svcs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th
Cir.2000) (prohibiting recovery under participation clause
where no EEOC complaint was filed prior to termination).5
Therefore, we need only address her claim insomuch as
it pertains to Brush’s opposition to an allegedly unlawful
employment practice by Sears. See also Little v. United
Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960
(11th Cir.1997) (noting also that plaintiff must have an
objectively reasonable belief that the employer engaged
in an unlawful employment practice).
Brush’s case rests upon her belief that her opposition
to rape and Sears’ handling of Mrs. Doe’s allegations are
actionable under Title VII. Under the framework provided
5.
Nonetheless, Brush urges on appeal that Total Sys. is no
longer good law because of such subsequent decisions as Thompson
v. North American Stainless, L P , -----U.S.------- , 131 S.Ct. 863,178
L.Ed.2d 694 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
C orp., -----U .S.-------, 131 S.Ct. 1325,179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011); and
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government o f Nashville & Davidson
County, Tennessee, 555 U.S. 271,129 S.Ct. 846,172 L.Ed.2d 650

(2009). We need not address that argument at this time because,
“ [u]nder the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by earlier
panel holdings ... unless and until they are overruled en banc or
by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355,
1359 (11th Cir.1997).
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by McDonnell Douglas Corp.,6 Brush must “carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802,93
S.Ct. 1817. We need only turn to the remaining stages of
the burden-shifting inquiry under McDonnell Douglas—
articulation of “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” by the defendant for the employment action, id. at
802,93 S.Ct. 1817, and showing of pretext by the plaintiff
regarding defendant’s stated reasons for the employment
action, id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817—if a prima facie case is
established.
To make a prima facie showing of a retaliation claim,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially
adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal
link between the protected activity and the subsequent
materially adverse employment action. Butler v. Ala.
Dep’t ofTransp., 536 F.3d 1209,1212 (11th Cir.2008). It is
the first prong, protected activity, which we now address.
Quite simply, Brush’s disagreement with the way
in which Sears conducted its internal investigation into
6.
While Brush disputes the applicability of McDonnell
Douglas under these circumstances, claiming that Pearson’s
declaration provides direct evidence of retaliation by Sears, we
cannot agree. Pearson’s declaration merely states his belief that
Brush’s termination was in retaliation for Brush’s opposition of
rape; nowhere does the declaration or any other evidence provided
by Brush detail specific conversations, communications or other
direct evidence of retaliatory intent on the part of Sears. Ac
cordingly, Brush can only prove her case through circumstantial
evidence, which necessitates the McDonnell Douglas framework.
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Mrs. Doe’s allegations does not constitute protected
activity. As required by the explicit language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a), to qualify as “protected activity,” a plaintiffs
opposition must be to a “practice made unlawful by [Title
VII.]” Since there is no evidence of Brush’s opposition
to any unlawful practice here, it follows that Brush can
support no claim under Title VII.
Although she seeks to predicate her claim for
retaliation upon Mrs. Doe’s claims of sexual harassment
and rape, Brush was neither the aggrieved nor the accused
party in the underlying allegations. Instead, she was
one of the Sears employees tasked with conducting the
internal investigation. As such, her claims relate not to
Mrs. Doe’s allegations, but instead to the procedures of the
internal investigation conducted by Sears. Although we
have found no published Eleventh Circuit cases regarding
whether such a basis is a viable foundation for a Title
VII retaliation claim, cf. Entrekin v. City of Panama
City, Fla., 376 Fed.Appx. 987, 994 (11th Cir.2010) (per
curiam) (unpublished case disallowing recovery under
similar circumstances), certainly internal investigations
alone do not constitute discriminatory practices. See,
e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d
1287,1304 (11th Cir.2007) (detailing type of investigative
procedures acceptable under Title VII). Nor do federal
courts mandate the procedures that are required under
such circumstances. See Adams v. O ’R eilly Automotive,
Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir.2008) (“Federal courts,
however, are not in the business of micromanaging or
second-guessing companies’ internal investigations.”);
see also Entrekin, 376 Fed.Appx. at 994 (“Title VII does
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n ot... establish requirements for an employer’s internal
procedures for receiving sexual harassment complaints,
or even require that employers must have an internal
procedure for receiving such complaints.”).
Nonetheless, Brush argues that an investigative
manager’s role in reporting a Title VII violation
necessarily qualifies as a “protected activity” relating
to a discriminatory practice. Reply Br. at 5 (“[W]hen
an employee communicates a belief that her employer
has engaged in employment discrimination, that
communication virtually always constitutes protected
activity.”). In support, Brush cites Crawford. In Crawford,
the Supreme Court held that an employee that responded
to an inquiry about whether she had ever witnessed
“inappropriate behavior” from a specific employee was
protected by Title VII. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 280, 129
S.Ct. 846. In so finding, the Court rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning that the opposition clause of Title
VII “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to
warrant... protection against retaliation.” Id. at 275,129
S.Ct. 846 (citing Crawford v. Metropolitan Government
of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed.Appx.
373, 373 (6th Cir.2006)). Instead, the Court stated that
the Crawford plaintiff’s opposition was no less actionable
because she had been asked about sexual harassment
rather than having volunteered similar allegations.
Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78,129 S.Ct. 846.
Brush would have us extend Crawford’s reasoning not
just to those directly impacted by workplace discrimination
but to all individuals involved in the investigation of that
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discrimination, no matter how far distant. Although we
have not yet passed on the transitive property of a Title
VII claim, other circuits have by creating what is known
as the “manager rule.” In essence, the “manager rule”
holds that a management employee that, in the course of
her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes
the actions of an employer does not engage in “protected
activity.” See McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478
(10th Cir.1996); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529
F.3d 617 (5th Cir.2008) (same). Instead, to qualify as
“protected activity” an employee must cross the line from
being an employee “performing her jo b ... to an employee
lodging a personal complaint.” McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486.
While Brush argues that Crawford has foreclosed the
“manager rule,” 7we cannot agree. Crawford pertained
only to whether the reporting of a harassment claim was
7.
Indeed, Brush cites several district court cases she claims
support this position: Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. o f America,
663 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y.2009), and Rangel v. Omni Hotel
Management Corp., No. SA-09-CV-0811 OG, 2010 W L 3927744
(W.D.Tex. Oct. 4,2010). However, it should go without saying that
we are not bound by the decisions of other circuits, let alone the
decisions of district courts from other circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218,1266 n. 66 (11th Cir.2012) (“ It
is axiomatic that this Circuit is bound only by its own precedents
and those of the Supreme Court... and certainly this is even more
true in the context of a district court determination from another
circuit.”) (citing Bonner v. City o f Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,1209
(11th Cir.1981)). This is even more obvious when considering
an opinion like Rangel, which is actually a magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommendation. See Rangel, 2010 W L 3927744, *1.
Nonetheless, both Rangel and Schanfield are easily distinguishable
from the facts at issue here.
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covered by Title VII where the reporting was solicited
rather than volunteered. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78,
129 S.Ct. 846. It did not address whether a disinterested
party to a harassment claim could use that harassment
claim as its own basis for a Title VII action. Accordingly,
we find the “manager rule” persuasive and a viable
prohibition against certain individuals recovering under
Title VII.
Considering the facts adduced by the parties in
light of the “manager rule,” there can be no dispute that
Brush acted solely as a manager here. In her capacity
as an investigator of Mrs. Doe’s sexual harassment
claim, Brush informed Sears of Mrs. Doe’s allegations,
investigated those allegations, and reported the results
of her investigation to Sears. Brush’s job responsibilities
involved exactly the type of actions that Brush took
on Mrs. Doe’s behalf. There is simply no evidence in
the record that Brush was asserting any rights under
Title VII or that she took any action adverse to the
company during the investigation. Cf. id. at 1486-87,
129 S.Ct. 846. Disagreement with internal procedures
does not equate with “protected activity” opposing
discriminatory practices. Under such circumstances,
the breadth of Crawford’s application to individuals who
suffered workplace discrimination is not transferable to
the entirety of the management string that might review
any such allegation.8
8.
Of course, we do not foreclose the ability of one employee
to “oppose” discrimination on another employee’s behalf. Cf.
Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d
Cir.1990) (recognizing right of third party to recover for
retaliation under such a basis). However, where, as here, a third
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The evidence in this record shows that Brush’s
opposition was to Sears’ failure to immediately summon
law enforcement and a more general “opposition] to the
grave forcible sex [alleged by Mrs. Doe].” Brush, however,
has not demonstrated how these actions were criminally
unlawful on the part of Sears. She has cited no state or
federal law that would have mandated Sears take some
action other that what it took. Sears fired the accused
offender. Nor has Brush demonstrated that Mrs. Doe in
this instance wanted her claims reported to the police.
In fact, it is undisputed that Mrs. Doe informed Brush
and Sears that she did not want either the police or her
husband informed of what happened to her. Under these
circumstances, then, it is impossible for Brush to have had
a reasonable belief that Sears’ actions were unlawful. Cf.
Little, 103 F.3d 956 at 960. Therefore, Brush’s deposition
testimony that she was “opposed [to] the way that Sears
Holding took care of our associates, took care of the
investigation” simply refutes any claim that she was
engaged in protected activity.
As a final matter, to the extent that Brush predicates
her argument of unlawful employment practices upon
the alleged rapes by the Store Coach, her argument
necessarily fails. She conceded both before the district
court and at oral argument that Sears is not tolerant
of rape and, in fact, did not tolerate it in this instance.
Nonetheless, she seeks to found her opposition upon her
principled stance against rape generally, and rape in
party is neither directly interested in the underlying discrimination
nor acting beyond the scope of her employment in opposing an
employer’s action, no Title VII claim will lie.
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the workplace particularly. However, opposition against
a general type of criminal behavior does not, without
some connection to the employer, constitute the type of
opposition to an unlawful employment practice that was
contemplated by Congress in passing Title VII.
Therefore, we echo the words of Entrekin: “because
[Brush’s] complaint involved the adequacy of [Sears’]
internal procedure for receiving sexual harassment
complaints, rather than an employment practice that Title
VII declares to be unlawful,” Entrekin, 376 Fed.Appx. at
994, her criticisms do not relate to unlawful activity. And,
since unlawful activity is the sine qua non of “protected
activity” as defined by Title VII, Brush cannot satisfy the
first requirement of a prima facie case for retaliation.9
Given our holding that Brush cannot satisfy the first
factor of the three-part prima facie case for retaliation,
we need not address the district court’s other bases for
granting summary judgment to Sears. In particular, we
decline to address the evidence of Brush’s PIP; Sears’
proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for Brush’s
termination; or Brush’s subsequent argument of pretext
under the burden-shifting inquiry under McDonnell
Douglas.

9.
Brush urges us that the EEOC letter of determination
should have some evidentiary weight. While we agree that an EEOC
reasonable cause finding may be admissible as evidence, Goldsmith
v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,1288 (11th Cir.2008), it alone
does not create a genuine dispute of material fact preventing the
granting of summary judgment.
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IV.
Having studied the record along with the parties’
briefs, and entertained oral argument, we find that
Brush did not engage in statutorily protected activity
and therefore cannot support a claim for retaliation under
Title VII. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee
Sears Holding Corporation.
AFFIRMED.
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APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
DATED JANUARY 14, 2011
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case #09-81290-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC
Janet Brush,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Sears Holdings Corporation
d/b/a Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court pursuant
to Defendant Sears Holdings Corporation d/b/a Sears,
Roebuck & Co.’s (“Defendant” or “Kmart”1) motion for
summary judgment, filed October 1,2010 [DE 33]. Plaintiff
Janet Brush (“Plaintiff”) responded on October 21, 2010
[DE 39]. Kmart replied on November 8, 2010 [DE 45].
This cause is also before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s
1. K mart is a subsidiary of Sears Holdings Corporation.
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motion to strike, filed October 22, 2010 [DE 40]. Kmart
responded on November 8,2010 [DE 46]. Plaintiff replied
on November 18,2010 [DE 48]. The Court held a hearing
on these motions on December 8,2010. This motion is ripe
for adjudication.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Inform ation R egarding P la in tiff’s
Employment
Plaintiff worked at Kmart as a Loss Prevention
District Coach (“LPDC”).2 Plaintiff was responsible for
minimizing risk to the company. Among other duties,
Plaintiff was responsible for controlling shrink (e.g.,
external and internal theft) and protecting Kmart’s assets
(e.g., people, facilities, and merchandise). Between the
years 2000 and 2006, Plaintiff was responsible for loss
prevention in approximately 10 stores in Florida. Plaintiff
aspired to become a Regional Loss Prevention Manager.
Toward that end, in 2006, Plaintiff accepted a position
as the LPDC over a 20-store district, which she held
until her employment was terminated. Plaintiff reported
to Regional Loss Prevention Coach (“RLPC”), David
Pearson (“Pearson” ), who, in turn, reported to Regional
Loss Prevention Director, Robert Church (“Church”).

2.
Plaintiff maintains she worked for K mart since 1992
and began working as a LP D C in 20 00. K mart maintains that
Plaintiff began working for K mart in 2000. This factual dispute
is immaterial; Plaintiff worked as an LPD C during the relevant
time period.
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In 2006, Plaintiff had a number of performance
deficiencies which were documented in her year-end
performance review. Plaintiffs performance deficiencies
included poor shrink results for her district, poor
inventory preparation, poor market control, poor staffing,
poor follow- up and poor time management. In early 2007,
Plaintiff was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan
(PIP) because of these deficiencies. Plaintiffs PIP was
extended to 120 days to ensure that she was meeting all
of the criteria for her position. Plaintiff completed her PIP
on approximately September 20, 2007.
Plaintiff failed to sustain sufficient performance
improvement, and her supervisors determined that her
termination was warranted. In early November 2007,
Pearson sent a memorandum to Church and Shelly Arnold
(“Arnold”), the Human Resources Manager for Kmart
Loss Prevention, in which he outlined Plaintiff’s ongoing
performance deficiencies and recommended termination.
On November 10, 2007, Pearson submitted his revised
memorandum to Arnold for review. The performance
issues identified by Pearson included: 1) unacceptable
levels of shrink in Plaintiff’s district; 2) sloppy and
unprofessional handling and follow up on the placement
of a loss prevention employee whose background check
included disqualifying information, which was met with
sharp criticism from the company’s Human Resources
Compliance Team; 3) failure to perform adequate store
visits; 4) failure to train store Loss Prevention Coaches
(LPCs) and ensure timely completion of corporate
initiatives; 5) poor communication with her supervisor;
6) failure to timely complete a children’s toy recall; and
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7) Plaintiff’s poor judgment and failure to follow-up
regarding an internal sexual harassment investigation.
Kmart determined that Plaintiff’s ongoing performance
problems and the unwanted risks associated with them
warranted termination. Plaintiff’s employment was
terminated on November 20,2007.
Plaintiff claims she was terminated in retaliation for
her participation in the sexual harassment investigation
and for her opposition to alleged violations of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”),
Fla. Stat. § 760.01, et seq.
B. The Sexual Harassment Investigation
Kmart evidently has its loss prevention department
play a role in internal sexual harassment investigations.
On September 15,2007, Plaintiff received a call on her cell
phone from an assistant store manager (“complainant”)
who alleged that she had been sexually harassed by her
store manager. The complainant stated that the manager
had been sending inappropriate text messages to her cell
phone. The complainant also disclosed to Plaintiff that
complainant’s husband found her cell phone and saw the
text messages from the manager. The complainant made
no mention of any sexual encounter with the manager,
consensual or otherwise.
Plaintiff communicated the complaint to Regional
Manager Dave Rodney (“Rodney”) and to Pearson. Keith
Johnson (“Johnson”), the Divisional Loss Prevention
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Director, emailed to Plaintiff and District Coach Scott
Reuter (“Reuter”), Plaintiffs operations counterpart,
the company’s sexual harassment investigation packet,
which contained forms and instructions on howto conduct
investigations.
On September 16, 2007, Plaintiff and Reuter were
instructed to travel to the store at issue and to suspend
the alleged harasser. Plaintiff and Reuter were next
instructed to meet with the complainant’s husband.
During that meeting, Plaintiff did not inquire as to the
circumstances under which he either came upon the
text messages or possessed his wife’s cell phone. After
meeting the complainant’s husband, Church and Johnson
instructed Plaintiff and Reuter to return to the store and
further investigate the allegations. Reuter interviewed
witnesses from the forms provided in the investigative
packet. Plaintiff acted as note-taker during the interviews.
Reuter and Plaintiff interviewed the complainant first.
Plaintiff later interviewed the complainant in private,
after which she informed Church that the complainant had
been raped and that law enforcement should be contacted.3
Plaintiff made that recommendation without having
reviewed the store’s surveillance video, having spoken
with the manager or other fact witnesses, or having
3.
Exactly what occurred during this interview is in dispute.
Plaintiff maintains that the complainant volunteered that she had
been raped. K mart maintains that Plaintiff suggested to the
complainant that the complainant had been raped. What did or
did not occur during this interview was not the exclusive basis for
the decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment, however
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made any effort to obtain details from the complainant
regarding the alleged rapes or otherwise test the veracity
of those new allegations. Church asked Plaintiff to refrain
from contacting the police until he sought guidance from
the company’s legal department.
Plaintiff was instructed to obtain copies of relevant
surveillance footage from the store. Plaintiff delegated
this task to Lisa Murphy, the store’s LPC, who was not
only the store manager’s subordinate but also a fact
witness in the investigation. Additionally, Plaintiff failed
to ensure that the video was properly annotated and never
reviewed the footage before it was sent to the corporate
office for analysis.
The store manager eventually admitted to a consensual
affair with complainant. His employment was terminated,
and the complainant was transferred to another store.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires entry of
summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment should be
granted when the record, taken as a whole, could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986). The non-moving party must go
beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for

23a
Appendix B

trial. Id. at 252,106 S.Ct. at 2512. It is not sufficient for the
non-moving party to show a mere “scintilla” of evidence,
or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly
probative, in support of its position. Id. Additionally,
conclusory allegations and conjecture are not sufficient to
overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Mayfield v.
Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371,1376 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the three-part
allocation of proof established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802-04,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25 (1973). If Plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts
to Kmart to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for the challenged employment actions. See Hanley v.
Sports Auth., 143 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
If Kmart does so, Plaintiff must show that Kmart’s
proffered reasons are a mere pretext for discrimination by
pointing to concrete evidence in the form of specific facts
discrediting Kmart’s proffered reason for the challenged
employment action. See Mayfield, 101 F.3d at 1376.
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under
Title VII and the FCRA, Plaintiff must prove that: (1)
she engaged in “protected activity”; (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Brown v. Snow, 440 F. 3d 1259,1266
(11th Cir. 2006); Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment
Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998)(“decisions
construing Title VII guide the analysis of claims under
the [FCRA]”).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Protected Activity
Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . .. because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Statutorily protected activity
is limited to where an employee: a) has made a charge,
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an
investigation, commonly known as the “participation
clause”; or b) has opposed any practice made unlawful by
Title VII, commonly known as the “opposition clause.” Id.
Plaintiff originally attempted to invoke protection
under both the participation and the opposition clauses.
Plaintiff alleges that her “participation” in the internal
investigation affords her protection under Title VII’s
“participation clause.” Plaintiff also invokes protection
under the “opposition clause” by claiming that she
“opposed” the manner in which Kmart conducted its
internal investigation. More specifically, Plaintiff claims
that her termination was motivated by her disagreement
with Kmart’s decision not to immediately summon
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local law enforcement to independently investigate
the allegations. Plaintiff’s claims, even if true, do not
constitute statutorily-protected activity under either
clause of the anti-retaliation statutes.
Plaintiff concedes in her response that she cannot
rely on the participation clause. The participation clause
applies only to “proceedings and activities which occur
in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge
with the EEOC; [and] does not include participating in
an employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted
apart from a formal charge with the EEOC.” EEOC v.
Total Syst. Svcs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,1174 (11th Cir. 2000),
reh’g en banc denied 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001). As
Plaintiff’s participation was in connection with Kmart’s
internal investigation, the participation clause does not
apply.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with Kmart’s decision not
to immediately summon local law enforcement does not
constitute protected activity under the opposition clause.
To constitute protected activity under this clause, the
conduct being opposed must be a “practice made unlawful
by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Fla. Stat.
§ 760.10(7) (“it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer... to discriminate against any person because
that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful
employment practice under this section”). While a plaintiff
need not prove that the employer’s conduct was actually
unlawful, the allegations and record must also indicate
that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively
reasonable. Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold
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Div., 103 F. 3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that

a plaintiff must show both a subjective belief that the
employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice
and that the belief was objectively reasonable). Whether
the belief is objectively reasonable is measured against
existing substantive law. Clark County School District
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269, 271,121 S.Ct. 1508, 150910 (2001) (holding that exposure to one sexist remark is
insufficient to constitute sexual harassment).
Plaintiff cannot establish that she engaged in activity
protected by the opposition clause. Kmart’s decision to
conduct additional investigation and to consult with its legal
department before acting on Plaintiffs recommendation to
call law enforcement is not an employment practice “made
unlawful” under either Title VII or the FCRA. These
statutes do not dictate how an employer must conduct
internal investigations of discrimination claims. “Title
VII does not...establish requirements for an employer’s
internal procedures for receiving sexual harassment
complaints, or even require that employers must have
an internal procedure for receiving such complaints.”
Entrekin v. City of Panama City, 376 Fed.Appx. 987,994
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in
protected activity because plaintiff’s complaint involved
adequacy of defendant’s internal procedure for receiving
sexual harassment complaints, rather than an employment
practice that Title VII declares to be unlawful). See also
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d
1287,1304 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that a company need not
“conduct a full-blown due process, trial-type proceeding
in response to complaints of sexual harassment. All that is
required of an investigation is reasonableness in all of the
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circumstances, and the permissible circumstances may
include conducting the inquiry informally in a manner that
will not unnecessarily disrupt the company’s business,
and in an effort to arrive at a reasonably fair estimate of
truth”).
Not only was there no legal requirement for Kmart to
contact law enforcement under the facts of this case, but
the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it would have
been inappropriate to do so. The complainant specifically
told Plaintiff that she did not want law enforcement
or her husband involved in the matter. When Plaintiff
urged Kmart to call the police she had done nothing to
test the rape allegations. Plaintiff had not obtained any
details from the complainant regarding the allegations,
had not reviewed surveillance video that might have shed
light on the veracity of complainant’s allegations, had not
yet questioned the accused store manager and had not
explored whether the sexual encounter was consensual.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with Kmart’s decision to
investigate further before contacting law enforcement is
not “opposition to conduct made unlawful” under Title VII
and, to the extent Plaintiff subjectively believed it was,
her belief was not objectively reasonable as measured
against existing substantive law. See Little, 103 F.3d at
960 (affirming summary judgment for employer where
Plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable belief
that his complaint constituted opposition to an unlawful
employment practice). Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish
that she engaged in statutorily protected activity under
Title VII or the FCRA.

28a
Appendix B

Even if the recommendation to contact law enforcement
constituted protected activity, Plaintiff’s claims would
still fail because her recommendation occurred during
the course of the performance of her job as LPDC
investigating an internal complaint. Although the
Eleventh Circuit has yet to address this issue, other
courts have held that a management employee who
disagrees with or opposes his employer’s decisions is not
engaging in protected activity if the employee is merely
performing her job. McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d
1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996) (judgment against personnel
director who claimed termination was in retaliation for
reporting overtime violations and informing her employer
she thought it was at risk for claims by others because she
was performing her job because she “never crossed the
line from being an employee merely performing her job
as personnel director to an employee lodging a complaint
about the wage and hour practices of her employer and
asserting a right adverse to the company”); Hagan v.
Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 630-31 (5th Cir.
2008)(affirming judgment for employer where manager
was not personally advocating on behalf of his technicians’
statutory rights under the FLSA but merely relayed their
concerns about their schedules; he did not “step outside the
role” of manager so as to engage in a protected activity
under the FLSA); Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc.,
380 F.Supp.2d 60, 62 (D. P.R. 2005) (rejecting Title VII
retaliatory discharge claim of human resources director
who advised the company president and vice-president
that he was investigating sexual harassment claims
against them as plaintiff’s actions were part of his job
responsibilities).
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As the LPDC for the store in question, Plaintiff
received the complaint and thereafter was assigned to
investigate same. Plaintiff and Reuter traveled to the
store, suspended the store manager, and conducted
interviews of the parties and all fact witnesses. Plaintiffs
recommendation to summon law enforcement was
consistent with her investigative authority. The packet
Johnson emailed to Plaintiff and Reuter specifically
instructed investigators to consider whether interim
actions should be taken during an investigation, such as
“Should the Law Department be involved?” and “Should
law enforcement be alerted?” (PI. Dep., Exh 2, p. 5.)
Thus, Plaintiffs recommendation that Kmart contact
law enforcement was consistent with both her role as an
investigator in the investigation and Kmart’s written
investigative guidelines. Because Plaintiff stayed within
her role of representing Kmart, she was not taking action
adverse to Kmart.
Plaintiff also claims that Kmart terminated her
because she “challenged” Kmart’s decision to hide the
complainant from view of the alleged harasser when
he arrived at the store to meet with corporate officials.
Plaintiff cites no record evidence to support this claim, and
her deposition testimony actually contradicts it. Plaintiff
testified that she complied with the request to move the
complainant from the store manager’s view. Additionally,
Plaintiff has offered no legal authority to establish that
secluding a complainant from an alleged harasser under
these circumstances is an unlawful employment action
under Title VII.
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Plaintiff’s allegation that she “disapproved” of the
store manager’s alleged rape is meaningless. Plaintiff
was not reporting something she personally observed at
Kmart, and she rushed to conclude that the complainant
had been “raped.” Plaintiff’s implication that those
involved in the investigation (including the complainant)
who did not endorse her recommendation to summon
law enforcement must, therefore, “approve” rape, is
nonsensical.4
Plaintiff cites Crawford v. Metropolitan Government
of Nashville and Davidson Division, 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009)
for the proposition that the “opposition clause,” unlike the
participation clause, can be triggered even when no EEOC
claim is pending. Defendant has not argued otherwise.
In any event, Crawford is factually distinguishable. At
issue in Crawford was whether a fact witness engaged in
protected activity when she provided information adverse
to the employer when questioned during an internal
harassment investigation. Id. at 850-51. The fact witness
in Crawford alleged that she herself was subjected to
harassment by the alleged harasser. Id. Here, Plaintiff
was not a fact witness reporting facts that she personally
observed. Rather, Plaintiff was an investigator who
merely relayed to her superiors secondhand information
obtained during the investigation. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
suggestion, Crawford did not address, let alone modify,
the long line of cases that preclude a finding of protected
activity when the activity occurs in the course of
performing one’s job duties.
4.
Indeed, Plaintiffs counsel stipulated at oral argument that
K mart disapproves of rape in the workplace. The Court never
doubted that such was the case.
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Plaintiff also cites Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Mfg., 617 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010), a post-Crawford decision
in which the court applied the “manager’s role” standard
to a plaintiff/scientist’s opposition-based retaliation claim.
The court concluded that the plaintiff/scientist stepped out
of his role because he assisted a subordinate with filing and
pursuing an internal discrimination complaint. Id. at 49.
The plaintiff/scientist also reported his own observations
of harassing conduct by the alleged wrongdoer. Id. at 4344. Collazo acknowledged Crawford for its clarification
as to the types of communication that could constitute
oppositional activity, but it did not interpret Crawford
as altering the rule that forecloses oppositional activity
claims by managers who are simply performing their
duties. Id. at 42,49.
Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp o f Am ., 663 F.Supp.2d

305 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), another case Plaintiff cites, is also
inapposite. In Schanfield, the court found that the plaintiff/
auditor stepped outside his role after he continued to raise
perceived discriminatory aspects of a rotational system
after being told not to do so. Id. at 317. As in Collazo, the
auditor was relaying first-hand information. Id. at 315-16.
Plaintiff was not reporting discriminatory conduct
that she personally observed. Instead, Plaintiff was simply
relaying to her superiors the allegations and facts obtained
from others during the course of her investigation.
Application of the “manager rule” in this case is consistent
with applicable precedent.
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B. Causal Connection
Even if Plaintiff could establish that she engaged
in statutorily protected activity, her claims would still
fail because she cannot establish that there was a causal
connection between her protected activity and her
termination.
Plaintiff maintains that Pearson told her that she
was terminated for violation of the policy for conducting
internal sexual harassment investigations. There is no
merit to Plaintiffs 14 contention that the necessary causal
connection is satisfied because Pearson suggested to her
that she was terminated for violating investigative policy.
Although there were numerous performance deficiencies
supporting the decision to terminate, Kmart’s concerns
about Plaintiffs role in the investigation were unrelated to
her request to summon law enforcement. The termination
memorandum, as well as Plaintiff’s sworn testimony,
makes clear that Kmart was dissatisfied with the manner
in which the rape allegation surfaced and Plaintiff’s
apparent indifference to her superiors’ request that she
provide them with relevant and adequately labeled store
surveillance footage. These issues relate to Plaintiff’s
judgment and failure to follow proper investigative
procedures, which are legitimate business concerns that
have nothing to do with statutorily protected activity.
As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a “causal connection”
between statutorily protected activity and her termination.
Plaintiff’s reliance on her tenure with the Company
and her removal from her PIP do not establish the
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necessary causal connection. The record reveals that,
after she was removed from the PIP, Plaintiff reverted
to the same performance level that led to her PIP in the
first place. In either event, many of the performance
deficiencies that led to her termination occurred after
her role in the investigation ended. These deficiencies,
therefore, were intervening events that would have broken
any causal chain between her alleged “protected activity”
and her termination.
C. L egitim ate, N on-D iscrim in atory Basis for
Employment Decision
Assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
of retaliation, Kmart has satisfied its burden of articulating
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its decision to
terminate Plaintiffs employment. Kmart’s termination
memorandum identified several performance deficiencies,
all of which contributed to Plaintiff’s termination of
employment. Plaintiff admits that time management was
a challenge for her, which affected her ability to meet
Kmart’s expectations. Plaintiff ranked among the lowest
loss prevention coaches in terms of shrink percentages,
and her inattention to detail and failure to follow up on
job assignments exposed Kmart to significant exposure.
Not only did she exhibit questionable judgment in the
investigation at issue, but she: 1) had unacceptable levels
of shrink; 2) demonstrated sloppy and unprofessional
handling and follow up on the placement of a loss
prevention employee whose background check included
disqualifying information (for which she was sharply
criticized by the company’s Human Resources Compliance
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Team); 3) failed to perform adequate store visits; 4) failed
to train Store LPCs and ensure timely completion of
corporate initiatives; 5) had poor communication with her
supervisor; and 6) failed to timely complete a children’s
toy recall that posed safety risks to children.
D. Pretext
Because Kmart has met its burden of articulating
legitimate reasons for its decision to terminate, Plaintiff
is required to establish that Kmart’s stated reasons are
pretextual. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519,
1543 (11th Cir. 1997) (“a plaintiff may not establish that
an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual merely by
questioning the wisdom of the employer’s reason, at least
not where, as here, the reason is one that might motivate
a reasonable employer”).
Plaintiff cannot establish that Kmart’s reasons are
pretextual. The performance problems that contributed
to Plaintiff’s termination arose long before the sexual
harassment investigation, and those problems were of such
concern that Kmart placed her on a PIP. Unfortunately,
Plaintiff failed to maintain an acceptable level of
performance after she was removed from the PIP. Kmart
determined that termination was in order because of her
persistent inattention to detail, “sloppiness,” and time
management problems.
Further, Kmart’s concerns were not unique to
Plaintiff. The evidence establishes that Kmart terminated
at least one other LPDC for similar reasons and had
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been critical of others in the past who did not follow
proper investigative protocol. Thus, the decisions at issue
were consistent with Kmart’s past practice. Because
Plaintiff cannot establish that the reasons supporting
Kmart’s decision were pretextual, she cannot establish
an actionable retaliation claim as a matter of law.
Plaintiff maintains that Kmart never discussed
her performance deficiencies with her. The record does
not support this contention. Plaintiff does not deny
the numerous performance problems identified in the
termination memo, and the record reflects that many,
if not all, of those issues were communicated to her
during her employment. Plaintiff, for example, testified
that she was aware that Kmart officials were very upset
with her handling of the hiring of an employee who had
disqualifying information on his record, that Pearson
was frustrated with her untimely completion of projects
and that Pearson may likely have spoken with her about
other concerns, including her failure to ensure her stores
had removed out-of-date merchandise and the haphazard
way she conducted her store visits. Many of these issues
had previously been brought to her attention and were
documented in her PIP.
Though there are several examples of performance
deficiencies identified in the record, Plaintiff only defends
her decision to meet privately with the complainant
during the investigation. Plaintiff claims that Kmart’s
investigative policies allowed for private meetings with
fact witnesses. A more complete examination of the record,
however, establishes that her decision to meet alone with
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the complainant exhibited poor judgment. Plaintiff, who
claims that her role was “note-taker” and that she and
Reuter were taking instruction from Kmart officials
during the investigation, initiated a private meeting
with the complainant despite Plaintiff’s acknowledgment
that she had no experience with sexual harassment
investigations. Plaintiff’s conduct in the investigation
contributed to her termination not because of any alleged
“protected activity,” but because of legitimate concerns
regarding her failure to follow proper investigative
technique and poor decision-making. Plaintiff herself has
terminated Kmart employees for similar reasons.
Plaintiff next attempts to “excuse” herself from
Kmart’s performance standards because she worked a
dual territory. Others at Kmart worked dual territories,
however, and Plaintiff voluntarily accepted the dual
market because she perceived it as a stepping stone to
promotion. Moreover, the record establishes that Kmart
has consistently enforced its performance standards and
terminated at least one other LPDC for failure to adhere
to the performance standards.
Plaintiff’s citation to a few favorable comments
contained in her 2006 performance evaluation does not
change the result. That Plaintiff’s older evaluations
included both positive and negative feedback does not
establish “ inconsistency” in Kmart’s position. The
inclusion of positive and negative feedback shows that her
performance evaluations were balanced.
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Plaintiff’s reference to an unrelated case against
Kmart in Pennsylvania is baffling because she does not
explain how it is relevant to this case.
Plaintiff’s claim that Kmart was “angry” with her
uncovering of the alleged rapes also is contradicted by
her own testimony. Plaintiff testified that, throughout the
investigative process, those who coordinated and monitored
the investigation dealt with her in a professional manner
and did or said nothing Plaintiff found offensive. Plaintiff
concedes that she probably should have had a witness
present when she met privately with the complainant
and was not educated enough to know whether there was
enough evidence to contact law enforcement. Plaintiff also
acknowledged that perhaps she failed to appreciate that
her superiors were doing their jobs and were working
with a sense of urgency.
Plaintiff’s alleged confusion about Kmart’s position on
the identity of “the decision- maker” is disingenuous. The
process for terminating the employment of someone at
Plaintiff’s level extends across different hierarchal levels.
Church testified that the termination process for someone
at Plaintiff’s level incorporates safeguards and multiple
levels of review. Church explained that Pearson’s decision
to recommend termination would be reviewed by Arnold,
who, if she agreed, would approve the termination and
submit it for review to the corporate team, including Tom
Arigi and the V.P. of Loss Prevention, Bill Titus. Plaintiff
fails to explain how this so-called conflict is relevant to
this case. Kmart does not defend on the ground that the
“decision-maker” was unaware fo the alleged protected
activity.
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As noted, Plaintiff maintains that Pearson told her that
she was terminated for violation of the policy for conducting
internal sexual harassment investigations. When Pearson
spoke with the EEOC and when he subsequently gave
his declaration to Plaintiff, he acknowledged that Kmart
had concerns about his performance and already had
terminated his employment. Pearson’s declaration
and statements to the EEOC do not constitute partyadmissions and are therefore not binding on Kmart. See
F.R.E. 801(d)(2).
Though Pearson now claims that he did not recommend
Plaintiff’s termination and believes her termination was
unwarranted, his input and the documents he authored
formed part of the basis for the decision to terminate
Plaintiff’s employment. Though Plaintiff claims that some
of the documents appear “suspect and seemingly altered,”
or are “bizarre” because written in different tenses, it
is significant that, in his declaration dated October 21,
2010, Pearson did not: 1) disavow his authorship of these
documents; 2) distance himself from the statements and
representations he made in those documents; or 3) support
Plaintiff’s unfounded allegations that Kmart “doctored”
or altered documents - even though the documents
were in Plaintiff’s hands long before Pearson signed his
declaration.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to exclude some of the
documentary evidence that she otherwise cannot
overcome. Plaintiff’s claim that she was “blind-sided” by
certain documents not only lacks substantive merit, but
she has not explained why she made no issue of these
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documents from the time they were served on August 24,
2010, to the filing of her Opposition on October 21, 2010.
If Plaintiff truly believed she was unduly prejudiced by
these documents, then she should have either filed a timely
motion to strike and/or sought Kmart’s agreement or,
alternatively, leave of court, to re-open discovery for the
limited purposes of conducting any necessary follow-up.
The documents at issue either were duplicative of
documents previously produced to Plaintiff, not responsive
to Plaintiff’s discovery and/or add nothing substantive
to the case. Plaintiff takes issue with Exhibit D to
Arnold’s declaration, Pearson’s termination memo, but
that document was previously produced to Plaintiff on
January 25,2010. Exhibit C to Arnold’s declaration is an
email from Pearson to Arnold attaching his first draft
of the termination memo. The draft is not only is lessinclusive than the final version of the memo, but Kmart
voluntarily produced the draft after Church’s deposition
because it tended to dispel Plaintiff’s suggestion that
Kmart had created the termination memo after her
termination on November 20,2007 - an issue Plaintiff had
not previously raised in discovery. This document merely
details Plaintiff’s myriad performance issues. Exhibit E
to Arnold’s declaration establishes that these performance
issues were identified prior to Plaintiff’s termination.
Plaintiff’s attempt to exclude comparative data
identified in Exhibit A to Human Resources Director
Chris Jemo’s declaration is equally without merit. This
document summarizes disciplinary action taken against
Reuter for failure to perform an appropriate investigation,
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merely underscoring that Kmart takes seriously failure
to follow investigative procedure.
Exhibits A-C to Church’s declaration add nothing
substantively to the case and were voluntarily produced
after Church’s deposition simply to clarify issues that
had arisen during his deposition. These documents
detail Plaintiff’s performance deficiencies, including her
failure to follow proper hiring procedure. In either event,
Church’s attestations in the declaration and the record as
a whole are more than sufficient to support the entry of
summary judgment.
The undisputed record evidence establishes that
Kmart is entitled to summary judgment in this action.
Plaintiff cannot establish “protected activity” or that
Kmart’s reasons for its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment are pretextual. Rather, the facts show
that Plaintiff was terminated because of performance
deficiencies that surfaced prior to her alleged protected
activity and that other associates have been terminated
for similar reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
THE COURT, being fully advised and having
considered the pertinent portions of the record, hereby
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, filed October 1, 2010 [DE 33], is
GRANTED. It is further
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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs motion
to strike, filed October 22,2010 [DE 40], is DENIED. Final
judgment shall be entered by separate order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Chambers in West Palm
Beach, Florida, this 14th day of January, 2011.
ZsZ____________________________
KENNETH L. RYSKAMP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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APPENDIX C — ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING AND FOR REHEARING EN
BANC OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
DATED MAY 31, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10657-DD
JANET BRUSH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
SEARS HOLDING CORPORATION,
d.b.a. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
May 31, 2012
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
BEFORE: DUBINA, Chief Judge, FAY and
KLEINFELD* Circuit Judges.
*Honorable Andrew J. Kleinfeld, United States Circuit
Judge, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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PER CURIAM:
The petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no Judge
in regular active service on the Court having requested
the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition for Rehearing
En Banc is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

M __________________________________
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

